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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In his famous words to the shareholders of his company in 2002, 
Warren Buffet, a man whose name resonates with many households 
as an extremely wealthy investment guru, condemned derivatives as 
“financial weapons of mass destruction.”1 Buffet made this comment 
in the context of Berkshire Hathaway’s own institutional investment 
dealings in regulated areas of derivatives, such as futures and op-
tions, where he has employed top analysts from across the country to 
utilize these investment vehicles to hedge against risk.2 But, if one of 
 * J.D. 2014, cum laude, Business Law Certificate, Florida State University College 
of Law. 
 1. Sam Ro, Berkshire Profits Plummet Thanks to Buffet’s Bets on ‘Financial Weapons 
of Mass Destruction,’ BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 5, 2011, 1:57 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/berkshire-profits-plummet-2011-11. 
 2. See id.; see also Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1993, 2007-08 (1995) (“After all, the Orange County Treasurer presumably had available to 
him the same computers, analytical tools and executive talent to examine and employ de-
rivatives as do the treasurer’s departments at multinational corporations like Dow Chemi-
cal, major banks and Wall Street dealers.”); id. at 1997 (“Both swaps and options are classi-
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the most notable investors in American history has such strong criti-
cism of this investment product, what does this mean for the average 
“Joe Schmo” investor who does not have the sophisticated investment 
knowledge as, say, a fortune 500 company and is investing in deriva-
tives not as a hedge but as a dangerous speculative investment? Even 
further, what does this mean for Joe when he decides to invest in an 
unregulated over-the-counter derivative for purposes of profiting off 
of volatile market movements? Does Joe need and deserve the protec-
tions of regulation? Does he want such protections? 
 Today, the average investor has the right and the luxury of invest-
ing in a wide range of regulated and unregulated investment vehicles 
in the derivatives market.3 With the downturn in the economy, de-
rivative investments in precious and industrial metals have piqued 
the interest of many Americans who believe the dollar is devalued 
and now buying less than it used to.4 With this increased interest by 
the general public, the unregulated over-the-counter precious and 
industrial metals industry has also attracted individuals who build 
disingenuous brokerage firms for the purpose of pouncing on fast, 
easy money by defrauding retail customers.5 As the fraudulent prac-
tices picked up and more and more retail investors began to lose their 
shirts in this high-risk investment,6 the regulators began watching 
the industry keenly.7  
fied as derivatives, though only the latter are currently regulated.”); id. at 2005 (“[O]ne 
should understand that derivatives lessen volatility by efficiently shifting risk from parties 
less able or willing to bear it to others with the resources to more readily absorb such risk 
in exchange for a potential profit.”).  
 3. See SUNIL PARAMESWARAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO STOCKS, BONDS, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, AND DERIVATIVES 16-22 (2011); 
Cohen, supra note 2, at 2000-02.   
 4. See Jon Burstein, Gold Firm Owner Sentenced in $29.5 Million Ponzi Scheme, 
SUN-SENTINEL (Nov. 18, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-11-18/news/fl-global-
bullion-exchange-20111118_1_global-bullion-exchange-jamie-campany-precious-metals. 
 5. See, e.g., id.; Press Release: PR6447-12, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, CFTC Charges Hunter Wise Commodities, Lloyds Commodities, C.D. Hopkins 
Financial, United States Capital Trust, Newbridge Alliance, Blackstone Metals Group, and 
Their Principals in Multi-Million Dollar Fraudulent Precious Metals Scheme (Dec. 5, 
2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6447-12) [hereinafter CFTC Press 
Release: PR6447-12]. One such individual is fraudster and owner of the metal company 
Global Bullion Exchange, Jamie Campany, who defrauded more than 1400 customers 
throughout the nation when he marketed unregulated precious and industrial metals to 
unsophisticated investors using high-pressure sales tactics when, in fact, no metal inter-
ests were actually sold to customers. Burstein, supra note 4. Campany simply ran a Ponzi 
scheme worth $29.5 million with little scrutiny by regulators for a number of years. Id.  
 6. See Burstein, supra note 4. Sun-Sentinel newspaper investigators found that be-
tween 2007 and 2010, more than forty-five precious metals dealers opened up in the South 
Florida area alone. Id. Additionally, nine of these dealers in South Florida have defrauded 
customers of over $91 million in losses. Id. 
 7. See CFTC Fraud Advisories—Precious Metals Fraud, U.S. COMM. FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/FraudAwarenessPrevention/ 
CFTCFraudAdvisories/fraudadv_preciousmetals (last visited June 22, 2014). 
                                                                                                                                        
2014]  RETAIL INVESTMENTS 801 
 
 This Note will highlight the jurisdictional struggle between the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the precious 
and industrial metals industry in the CFTC’s attempt to regulate the 
retail commodity transaction that takes place between the average 
retail investor and the brokerage firm soliciting the transaction, 
namely the “retail dealer.”8 Further, after taking a look at the past 
legal stance of both parties involved, this Note will analyze whether 
an over-the-counter investment in precious and industrial metals 
should be regulated and what level of regulation, if any, would be 
best suited for this unique investment product and its controlling in-
dustry participants. Finally, I propose a potential solution that takes 
all of the parties and transaction cost issues into account: a restricted 
regulatory approach.  
II.   DERIVATIVES 101 
 Before one can analyze whether regulation of an over-the-counter 
investment vehicle in precious and industrial metals is proper, it is 
important to know the basics of derivatives and how some derivative 
products are currently regulated. An explanation of the exact deriva-
tive at issue, “look-alike” precious and industrial metal futures,9 will 
follow in the proceeding Parts. Starting at the beginning, a derivative 
is defined as “[a] security whose price is dependent upon or derived 
from one or more underlying assets.”10 A derivative’s value is deter-
mined through underlying market factors and the movement of such 
factors.11 These factors can include movements in interest rates, cur-
rency exchange rates, commodity prices, and prices of other assets.12 
Most derivatives are traded by sophisticated institutional investors, 
such as Mr. Buffet’s company, as a hedge against the risk of the un-
derlying product losing value at a future date of delivery.13 Since 
 8. Terms and characterization of industry participants are based off court records in 
the present litigation, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commod-
ities, LLC, No. 9:12-CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 5, 2012). 
 9. Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermedi-
aries, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,410, 55,414-15 (Sept. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 4, 
5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, & 166). The term “look-alike” is derived from the CFTC’s charac-
terization of “spot” or “cash forward” transactions in the foreign exchange industry, id., a 
transaction proposed later by this Note to be identical to the current transaction in pre-
cious and industrial metals at issue.  
 10. Definition of ‘Derivative,’ INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/ 
derivative.asp (last visited June 22, 2014); see PARAMESWARAN, supra note 3, at 16. 
 11. Cohen, supra note 2, at 2004-05; Definition of ‘Derivative,’ supra note 10.  
 12. Cohen, supra note 2, at 2004-05; Definition of ‘Derivative,’ supra note 10. 
 13. Cohen, supra note 2, at 2003-05; Christine Cuccia, Informational Asymmetry and 
OTC Transactions: Understanding the Need to Regulate Derivatives, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
197, 199 (1997); see also Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis & Lisa M. Fairchild, Illuminating the 
Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 
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many investors at the retail level generally use derivatives as a spec-
ulative investment,14 rather than as a hedge against risk, a speculat-
ing derivatives holder will enter into a contract in an attempt to prof-
it from positive fluctuations in the market value of the investment.15 
Although the financial concepts of the many different types of deriva-
tives are complex, basic knowledge of a derivative is enough here to 
obtain a legal understanding of the investment vehicle further ana-
lyzed in this writing.16  
 There are two main types of derivative contracts: over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives.17 OTC deriva-
tives are not traded through the use of an exchange, whereas ex-
change-traded derivatives are executed through specialized deriva-
tive exchanges.18 An exchange is a centralized location where inves-
tors can trade a specific standardized investment product.19 
 The regulatory agency that provides regulation and enforcement 
of most derivative products and of the respective firms who sell these 
derivatives is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”).20 The CFTC was created in 1974 as an independent agency 
with the mandate though the CFTC Act of 1974 to regulate commodi-
ty futures and option markets in the U.S.21 Most products regulated 
by the CFTC trade on registered exchanges; although, in recent 
years, the CFTC has regulated some over-the-counter industries.22 It 
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 504 (2010) (“OTC derivatives are often created precisely because 
there is no standardized derivative product available for the risk management needs of the 
parties involved.”); Ro, supra note 1. 
 14. Since derivatives are complicated instruments that, as discussed later, are diffi-
cult to understand to those even trained in portfolio management, it is assumed that many 
investors at the retail level also have a difficult time using derivatives as a hedge and 
simply invest in the derivatives market to speculate in the price movement. See Definition 
of ‘Derivative,’ supra note 10; Definition of ‘Speculation,’ INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/speculation.asp (last visited June 22, 2014); see also 
Cuccia, supra note 13, at 200 (explaining that companies, rather than individual investors, 
usually use the sophisticated process of hedging as a form of risk management in order to 
make huge profits for their company.).  
 15. Definition of ‘Derivative,’ supra note 10; Kristina Zucchi, Derivatives 101, 
INVESTOPEDIA (June 29, 2013), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/ 
10/derivatives-101.asp.   
 16. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 2000, where Cohen, the author and adjunct professor 
at Fordham University School of Law, recalls when one of his clients described derivatives 
as “ ‘any financial product that is difficult to understand.’ ” 
 17. PARAMESWARAN, supra note 3, at 16, 24-27.   
 18. See id. at 24-25, 27 tbl.1.3. 
 19. Id. at 24-25. 
 20. Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermedi-
aries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3282, 3282-83 (proposed Jan. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, & 166).  
 21. Id. at 3283. 
 22. Id. at 3283-3285; Gregory Meyer, Watchdog Closes Retail Forex Loophole, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2010, 7:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/97077034-ffaf-11de-921f-
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is also worth noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Futures Trading Commission have also taken part in regula-
tion of some derivative products.23  
III.   INVESTMENTS IN PHYSICAL PRECIOUS                                                   
AND INDUSTRIAL METALS DERIVATIVES 
 Investments in physical precious and industrial metals like gold, 
silver, palladium, and platinum have always had downsides to their 
use as speculative investments due to the large transaction costs in-
volved in storing, moving, and insuring the metals in secure deposi-
tories.24 However, over the years, this investment has cleverly made 
itself available to average, unsophisticated retail customers without 
the need to transfer the physical product, making it a product that 
can be easily traded and accessible for speculation.25   
 In order to accomplish the difficult feat of reducing transaction 
costs enough that the average investor can engage in such an in-
vestment (but keeping in mind a court has not yet ruled on the valid-
ity of such business practices), a series of steps is taken in order to 
pass the investment down to the ultimate customer.26 “Wholesalers” 
contract with one or more depositories in order to obtain an interest 
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OwL7X4Cl. 
 23. Meyer, supra note 22; Gregory Meyer, US Retail FX: War Waged on Cowboy Prac-
tices, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010, 5:38 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d881a1a-c9c6-11df-
b3d6-00144feab49a.html.  
 24. See STAFF OF S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, 113TH CONG., EXPLORING THE PERILS OF 
THE PRECIOUS METALS MARKET 4-5 (2014), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/Precious%20Metals%20Market%20-%20Summary%20of%20Committee%20Staff 
%20Investigation.pdf; PIERO CINQUEGRANA, THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN COMMODITY 
AND COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS 1-2 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2005039; Cohen, supra note 2, at 2003-04; Cuccia, supra note 
13.  
 25. STAFF OF S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, supra note 24, at 2-3. 
 26. The processes by which retail investors receive investments in precious and indus-
trial metals, although not new in practice, has not been directly legally analyzed at the 
retail level in academic works. Most information regarding the retail processes regarding 
the transfer of the investment from wholesaler to retail investor can be found in current 
litigation documents involving players of the industry and the U.S. Government. However, 
as discussed later, similar transactions have taken place in the foreign exchange industry 
and many of the processes of this industry are the same. See generally Complaint for In-
junctive & Equitable Relief & Penalties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, U.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, No. 9:12-CV-81311 
(S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Hunter Wise Complaint] (The Complaint refers to 
company names when describing each participant in the transaction. In this situation, 
Hunter Wise Entities is the wholesaler, Lloyds Commodities acts as the intermediary, and 
CD Hopkins, Blackstone, Newbridge, and USCT conduct business as retail dealers.); 
CINQUEGRANA, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing the “downstream level” as retail and the 
“upstream level” as wholesale); Lydia Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling a Financial 
Jurassic Park: Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Derivatives by Regulating Illegal Foreign Cur-
rency Boiler Rooms, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 35 (2007) (explaining the similar issues that 
occurred in the foreign exchange industry).  
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in physical metal.27 This interest in metal is recorded by a bookkeep-
ing entry on the wholesaler’s books, and the wholesaler keeps record 
of a fungible pool of inventory of which it has purchased from multi-
ple depositories.28 In order to decrease actual transaction costs and 
the risks involved, these wholesalers never actually obtain a physical 
inventory or move metal to their own depositories.29 
 In turn, a wholesaler then enters into a contract with one or more 
intermediaries, who act more or less as sales representatives and 
counterparties to smaller companies, or “retail dealers.”30 Retail 
dealers act as brokerage firms and solicit economic interest in the 
metals to retail investors.31 Like the transaction between wholesaler 
and depository, all other steps along the way are recorded by 
bookkeeping the inventory with no physical metal changing hands.32 
The retail customer (synonymous with retail investor) then enters 
into an investment contract through his broker employed by the 
dealer, in order to obtain the interest in the metal of which the cus-
tomer trades for speculation purposes.33 With each step in the trans-
action, the transaction costs associated with the metal increase, with 
the ultimate retail customer paying the highest transaction cost, but 
this ultimate cost on the retail customer is a cost that is more eco-
nomically practical than would arise if a customer had to move metal 
in order to trade a position.34 Such transaction fees at this level in-
clude commission fees, interest on loans, storage fees, insurance fees, 
and service charges based on a percentage of the product pur-
 27. See Defendants Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, Hunter Wise Servs., LLC, 
Hunter Wise Credit, LLC, Hunter Wise Trading, LLC, Harold Edward Martin, Jr., & Fred 
Jager’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), & 
Inc. Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof ¶¶ 8-9, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, No. 9:12-CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2013) 
[hereinafter Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss]; Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, 
¶¶ 40-41. 
 28. See Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶¶ 8-9; Hunter Wise Com-
plaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 61, 63, 99; see also CINQUEGRANA, supra note 24, at 10. 
 29. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 59-66, 99; CINQUEGRANA, supra 
note 24, at 3 & n.3. See generally Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27.   
 30. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 40-42, 48; U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. 20/20 Trading Co., No. SACV11-643-JST(FMOx), 2011 WL 2221177, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2011). An illustrative diagram of the investment flow may be helpful: 
Wholesaler  Intermediary/Counterparty  Retail Dealer  Ultimate Investor. 
 31. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 31, 35-37; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 
WL 2221177, at *1-2.  
 32. See Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶ 48.  
 33. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 31-33.  
 34. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 32-33; CINQUEGRANA, supra note 
24, at 3, 10. 
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chased.35 Additionally, each intermediary along the way receives a 
percentage markup on the spread.36 
 It is important to note that investors at the retail level are simply 
entering into the contract with the dealer in order to trade in one     
or more physical metal products.37 That is, these investors are ulti-
mately betting on market movements that affect the price of the 
metal thereby receiving the negative or positive difference on the 
spread of the price of the metal.38 Although many investors have the 
option in these transactions to take physical delivery of metals, in-
vestors choose not to, as their main goal is simply to speculate in the 
metals market rather than hold a vault containing their own metal in 
their basement.39  
 Another aspect of these transactions involves the use of financing 
or leverage.40 Although the difference between the term “finance” and 
“leverage” has been an issue in court, the ultimate end to the process 
involves the investor receiving additional funds on loan in order to 
buy more metal than his own dollar would afford him.41 Consistent 
with most other types of derivative contracts, many investors choose 
to finance or leverage their positions of metal in order to obtain a 
larger purchasing power and thereby acquire a larger profit if the 
volatile metal markets move in the investor’s favor.42 For example, a 
retail customer will typically put down twenty to twenty-five percent 
of the total metal value as a “down payment,” and then the dealer, 
through use of funds made available to him by the wholesaler, will 
finance the remaining product of the metals.43 This loan process 
leaves the retail customer indebted to the dealer, and the retail    
 35. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 33. 
 36. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 3, 33, 41-42.  
 37. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 3, 31-37; Defendants’, Newbridge 
Alliance, Inc. and John King, Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum 
of Law ¶¶ 10-12, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, 
LLC, No. 9:12-CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Newbridge Motion to Dis-
miss].  
 38. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 31-34; CINQUEGRANA, supra note 
24, at 4. 
 39.  See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 3, 31-34. 
 40. See Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, pt. III, ¶¶ 28-33, Hunter Wise 
Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 31; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 20/20 Trad-
ing Co., No. SACV11-643-JST(FMOx), 2011 WL 2221177, at *1, *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 
2011) (discussing the definitions and legal implications of a leveraged transaction under 
CFTC regulations); see also STAFF OF S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, supra note 24, at 2, 6-9. 
 41. See Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, pt. III, ¶¶ 28-33; Hunter Wise 
Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 31; see also 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 WL 2221177, at *1, *5-6.  
 42. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 32-34; Hunter Wise Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 26, ¶¶ 66-71; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 WL 2221177, at *1. 
 43. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 31-32; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 
WL 2221177, at *1. 
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customer pays interest charges on the loan at a specified rate.44 It is 
ultimately the investor’s choice to participate in a financed transac-
tion as the investor has the option to purchase one-hundred percent 
of the metal outright and to choose whether to have the metal deliv-
ered or not.45 
 Since the inception of this product, such investments have never 
traded on an exchange or board of trade.46 Furthermore, this invest-
ment product and industry has found a loophole in the regulation, as 
it mimics many aspects of a futures contract but has never been regu-
lated by any regulator, including the CFTC.47 Not only has the prod-
uct itself never been regulated, but the brokerage firms who solicit 
these investments from the public have also escaped any kind of dis-
closure, reporting, or recordkeeping requirements.48  
A.   What Is the Problem? 
 Of course, with any “hole” in a regulation, intentional or not, there 
are bad actors that emerge to take advantage of the regulatory gap.49 
Even further, as in this situation, bad actors of the industry have an 
easier way to commit fraud than they would have otherwise, as there 
is no watchdog keeping track of the firms’ practices. Unmonitored 
brokers commit fraud by taking on a salesperson role and going right 
after the unsophisticated investor, saying whatever needs to be said 
to close the deal.50 In many cases, these customers believe what they 
are told, do not investigate the investment further, and do not realize 
the immense risk involved in not only trading in a volatile market 
 44. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 31-34, 77; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 
WL 2221177, at *1. 
 45. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 31-32; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 
WL 2221177, at *1. 
 46. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-6 (The government alleges that de-
fendants have unlawfully engaged in investment in futures contracts of precious metals 
outside of an exchange); see also 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 WL 2221177, at *1-4.  
 47. See Jon Burstein, Little Regulation, Lots of Risk Can Leave Gold Investors on 
Shaky Ground, SUN-SENTINEL (Mar. 19, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-03-
19/news/fl-leveraged-gold-industry-20110303_1_precious-metals-owner-jamie-campany-
gold-investors; see also Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶¶ 66-80; Hunter 
Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-3 (Although the CFTC argues it has been able to 
regulate this type of transaction and industry since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Protection Act of 2010 became effective on July 16, 2011, industry participants dispute 
otherwise. However, it is clear that prior to the effective date of Dodd-Frank, this industry 
was unregulated by the CFTC or any other regulator.); 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 WL 
2221177, at *5-8. 
 48. See Burstein, supra note 47; see also Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-
3; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 WL 2221177, at *5-8.  
 49. See Burstein, supra note 4; Burstein, supra note 47. 
 50. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 2-3, 11; 20/20 Trading Co., 2011 
WL 2221177, at *1, Pierre-Louis, supra note 26, at 36-37. 
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such as metals, but also in buying such product on margin.51 The 
more of these investors who that get scammed and the richer these 
fraudulent dealers become, the more enticing the metals marketplace 
becomes to future fraudulent dealers.52 For this reason, the CFTC 
has taken a stand in regulating this currently unregulated industry 
in the name of consumer protection.53  
B.   Current Events 
 As of April 2014 there is a pending litigation between the CFTC 
and many current actors in the physical precious and industrial met-
als industry, each side having their own arguments on what this in-
vestment entails.54 Amongst those being sued by the CFTC are 
wholesalers, intermediaries, and dealers who all sell such invest-
ments at different levels in the marketplace.55  
 The main issues in this litigation revolve around whether: 1) the 
CFTC has the jurisdiction to regulate this type of transaction as a 
financed commodity transaction with retail customers; and 2) the 
transaction is an illegal, and thereby fraudulent, off-exchange fi-
nanced commodity transaction with retail customers.56  
 The CFTC argues that Section 742 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) 
broadened the scope of CFTC jurisdiction under the Commodity and 
Exchange Act (“CEA”) to include this specific type of transaction un-
der CEA Section 2(c)(2)(D).57 Furthermore, since the CFTC believes 
 51. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 2-3, 78-85; 20/20 Trading Co., 
2011 WL 2221177, at *1; Pierre-Louis, supra note 26, at 36-38; Burstein, supra note 4 (al-
leging that the firm targeted the elderly, as “[t]he majority of the firm’s 20 largest clients 
were senior citizens”); Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioner, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Current 
SEC Issues of Interest (Jan. 19, 1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speecharchive/1995/spch026.txt (“Derivatives are not inherently bad or good—they’re just 
volatile.”).  
 52. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 4 (“Global Bullion Exchange was part of an explo-
sion of precious metals firms that set up shop in Broward and Palm Beach counties, operat-
ing in what has been a largely unregulated niche of the precious metals industry. More 
than 45 firms opened locally between 2007 and [2010], most offering gold, silver and palla-
dium via heavily financed transactions. A Sun-Sentinel investigation in March found that 
convicted felons and people with checkered regulatory histories were able to operate such 
businesses with little—if any—scrutiny.”). 
 53. See generally Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26; CFTC Press Release: 
PR6447-12, supra note 5. 
 54. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 
No. 9:12-CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 5, 2012). 
 55. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 10-11.  
 56. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-6; Hunter Wise Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 26, ¶¶ 28-40, 64-65, 82-83, 100-01. 
 57. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-2, 27-28; see Interpretation of Retail 
Commodity Transactions Under Commodity Exchange Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 52,426, 52,426 
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that these transactions come under its jurisdiction, it further con-
tends that these retail commodity transactions are required to be ex-
ecuted on an exchange.58  
 Section 2(c)(2)(D) of the CEA is entitled “Retail Commodity 
Transactions” and states as follows:  
[T]his subparagraph shall apply to any agreement, contract, or 
transaction in any commodity that is—(I) entered into with, or of-
fered to (even if not entered into with), a person that is not an     
eligible contract participant or eligible commercial entity; and (II) 
entered into, or offered (even if not entered into), on a leveraged   
or margined basis, or financed by the offeror, the counterparty, or 
a person acting in concert with the offeror or counterparty on a 
similar basis.59  
 Further, the CFTC contends that the wholesaler “does not actual-
ly buy, sell, loan, store, or transfer physical metals in connection 
with” their transactions, but rather it “records and tracks customer 
orders and trading positions.”60 Instead, the CFTC equates these 
transactions with those of futures contracts.61 
 The precious and industrial metal industry participants, as indi-
vidual defendants involved in different levels of the transaction in 
this case, argue that the CFTC fails to show that they have jurisdic-
tion over their industry because the CFTC “has inappropriately at-
tempted to unilaterally expand its Congressional grant of authority 
by characterizing a physical spot transaction as a contract for sale of 
a commodity for future delivery.”62 These industry participants state 
that the Dodd-Frank Act did not intend to include financed products 
as evidenced by the fact that Congress followed the word “financed” 
in Section 2(c)(2)(D) with “on a similar basis,” thereby indicating that 
Congress is referring only to transactions that are leveraged or mar-
gined.63 The industry defendants refute that these transactions are 
(Aug. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) (discussing the addition of Section 
2(c)(2)(D) to the CEA).  
 58. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-2, 29-30. 
 59. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(D) (2012).  
 60. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 46.  
 61. Id. ¶¶ 46, 103, 107-10, 195-98. The CFTC has previously made similar arguments 
regarding futures contracts. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. 
Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 62. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶ 25. Similarly, at least one court 
has determined that the CFTC did not have the authority, based on its ability to regulate 
futures contracts, to regulate certain contracts for the speculative sale or purchase of for-
eign currency. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
 63. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶ 29; Newbridge Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 37, ¶¶ 31-46; Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Memorandum of Law of 
Defendants Lloyds Commodities, LLC, Lloyds Commodities Credit Company, LLC, Lloyds 
Services, LLC, James Burbage and Frank Guardino, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
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leveraged, margined, or financed on a similar basis as the duration of 
the transaction does not exceed ten years, a mandatory requirement 
of a contract that is leveraged or margined.64  
 The wholesaler, in particular, also refutes the CFTC’s position 
that it engages in futures contracts; rather, it states that it conducts 
business with an array of banks and institutions “from whom it pur-
chases and to whom it sells inventory” in order to fulfill the various 
orders of its clients in physical precious and industrial metals.65 In-
stead of futures contracts, the wholesaler says that it purchases and 
sells “ ‘[c]ash forward’ or ‘spot’ contracts [that] are not subject to reg-
ulation because the underlying commodity in the transaction holds 
an ‘inherent value’ to the transacting parties, and actually involve[s] 
the sale of the underlying commodity.”66 
 An important aspect of cash forward or spot contracts is that they 
do not have terms that are standardized, whereas futures contracts 
are fungible contracts and have standard terms.67 The wholesaler 
contends that these transactions are not standardized because the 
customers buy metals of varying price, quantity, settlement dates, 
delivery, and financing immediately rather than at a future date.68 
 On February 26, 2013, the court issued an order granting the pre-
liminary injunction requested by the CFTC and against the defend-
ant parties of the metals industry.69 In the order, Judge Donald M. 
Middlebrooks made the finding that the CFTC has jurisdiction over 
Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, No. 9:12-CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2013) 
(explicitly incorporating by reference all arguments from the Hunter Wise Motion to     
Dismiss). 
 64. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 26, ¶¶ 30-40; see also U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. 20/20 Trading Co., No. SAVC11-643-JST(FMOx), 2011 WL 
2221177, at *5-8 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that precious and industrial metals contracts 
allowing investors to speculate in the metals market can only be classified in two ways: 
futures or leveraged contracts, and a contract that does not satisfy the ten year durational 
requirement cannot be a leveraged contract).  
 65. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶ 8; see also Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 
at 865 (finding that in futures contracts, terms are standardized “mak[ing] it possible to 
close a position by buying an offsetting contract,” and finding in contrast that “forward      
or spot contracts, are not purchased identically and each is unique in the amount and    
timing”).  
 66. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶ 67 (internal citation omitted). 
See generally Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, at 867 (concluding that spot or forward transactions 
are not traded “in the contract” but rather “in the commodity.”).  
 67. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶¶ 68-71; see also PARAMESWARAN, 
supra note 3, at 16-17; D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 13, at 504; Elizabeth D. Lau-
zon, Annotation, What are “Contracts of Sale of a Commodity for Future Delivery” Within 
Meaning of Commodity Exchange Act, 182 A.L.R. Fed. 559 (2002). 
 68. Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶¶ 76-77; see also D’Souza, Ellis & 
Fairchild, supra note 13, at 504; Lauzon, supra note 67. 
 69. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, No. 
12-81311-CIV, 2013 WL 718503, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013) (order granting preliminary 
injunction). 
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the matter at bar under the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 2(c)(2)(D), and 
the transaction is financed as contemplated by the statute.70   
 Since this order was handed down by Judge Middlebrooks, a num-
ber of changes have occurred in the lawsuit. First, the court entered 
summary judgment against the Defendants as to many disputed is-
sues in the litigation thus far, most importantly finding that the 
CEA’s requirement that those engaged in commodities transactions 
to purchase and sell those commodities on a regulated board of trade, 
exchange, or contract was not facially vague, or vague as applied to 
the dealers.71 The court also reiterated that Section 742 of Dodd-
Frank expanded the scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction to encompass 
this type of transaction.72 Additionally, many of the retail dealer de-
fendants and even the intermediary involved in this case have since 
opted to settle with the CFTC rather than litigate the suit and con-
sent decrees ordering permanent injunctions and damages have been 
issued against them.73 Therefore, the final order will deal primarily 
with the allegations against the wholesaler.   
 Unsurprisingly, many of these issues have been previously litigat-
ed regarding other similar investment products. Not only has the 
court had trouble defining such “modified” derivative products that 
seem to veer slightly from conventional derivatives in the given area, 
but the CFTC has also continued to struggle with jurisdiction issues 
regarding other OTC derivatives.  
C.   Jurisdictional Disputes with the Metals Industry 
 The CFTC has had jurisdictional issues in regulating types of de-
rivatives contracts similar to these over-the-counter precious and in-
dustrial metals transactions spanning back to the 1970s.74 To clear 
up this confusion, Congress has passed additional laws and the 
CFTC has published further interpretations regarding retail com-
 70. Id. at *7-9. 
 71. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, No. 
12-81311, 2014 WL 652888, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (order granting summary 
judgment against Defendants on certain claims and issues). 
 72. Id. at *1. 
 73. See Consent Order for Permanent Injunction, Civil Monetary Penalty, and Other 
Equitable Relief Against United States Capital Trust, LLC and David A. Moore, No. 9:12-
CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2014) (example of settlement agreement with one of the many 
groupings of dealer Defendants who settled); Consent Order for Permanent Injunction, 
Civil Monetary Penalty and Other Equitable Relief Against Lloyds Commodities, LLC, 
Lloyds Commodities Credit Company, LLC, Lloyds Services, LLC, James Burbage and 
Frank Gaudino, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, 
LLC, No. 9:12-CV-81311 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2014) (settlement agreement with intermediary 
firm Lloyds Commodities, LLC). 
 74. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 
573, 576-81 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Precious 
Metals, LLC, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282-87 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
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modity transactions in an attempt to clarify the CFTC’s jurisdic-
tion.75 Each past enactment, however, seemed to provide less and less 
clarity on the issue and produce further issues in the courts.76  
 Prior to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC 
sued a dealer firm selling physical precious metals to retail investors 
through telephone solicitation,77 a similar transaction as the one cur-
rently in litigation. In the 2011 case Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. American Precious Metals, LLC, the CFTC alleged 
that the defendants committed fraud in violation of Section 19 of the 
CEA and CFTC Rule 31.3.78 The defendants contended that the 
CFTC lacked regulatory jurisdiction under Section 19 because the 
contracts at issue lasted for less than ten years, and “any contract 
lasting fewer than ten years was . . . not a leverage contract” as de-
fined by CFTC Rule 31.4(w).79 The court sided with the defendant 
dealer, finding that since the CFTC had previously interpreted its 
own regulation narrowly multiple times, the CFTC’s regulatory ju-
risdiction only extended to leverage contracts as defined by Rule 
31.4(w).80 The CTFC’s case was therefore dismissed.81  
 The CFTC experienced a huge defeat when the court ordered that 
the agency lacked jurisdiction over these physical metal transactions. 
However, after this case was decided, Dodd-Frank took effect and 
added the term “financed” to the CEA.82 The true meaning of this ad-
dition has not been fully litigated.83  
 75. Am. Precious Metals, LLC, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1282-87; Interpretation of Retail 
Commodity Transactions Under Commodity Exchange Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,670, 77,670-72 
(Dec. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) (explaining the prior enactment of laws 
regarding retail commodity transactions that led to the necessity of implementing further 
law by Congress in Dodd-Frank). 
 76. See Am. Precious Metals, LLC, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1282-87; Interpretation of Retail 
Commodity Transactions Under Commodity Exchange Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 77,670-72.  
 77. Am. Precious Metals, LLC, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82. 
 78. Id. at 1281. 
 79. Id. at 1284. 
 80. Id. at 1285-87.  
 81. Id. at 1287-88. Similar reasoning was used in U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. 20/20 Trading Co., where the court held that the CFTC did not have jurisdic-
tion over similar types of metals transactions as the contracts did not meet the definition of 
leveraged contracts. No. SACV11-643-JST(FMOx), 2011 WL 2221177 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
 82. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 742(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1732-33 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(D)). 
 83. See generally Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27. But see U.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, No. 12-81311-CIV, 
2013 WL 718503, at *8, *11 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013). The court held in the order granting 
a preliminary injunction that the retail precious and industrial metal transactions were 
now considered to be financed products as contemplated by the addition of the word “fi-
nanced” by the Dodd-Frank Act. However, a permanent injunction has not yet been issued 
on the matter. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, 
LLC, No. 12-81311-CIV, 2014 WL 652888, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (finding that the 
commodities transactions involved were financed through loans and “the financed precious 
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 As the situation between the CFTC and the precious and industri-
al metals industry progresses, it is becoming quite obvious that the 
CFTC has encountered a similar situation in its past. Like the cur-
rent issue, it took the CFTC years to establish regulatory jurisdiction 
and impose regulation upon the foreign exchange industry, an indus-
try proposed here as one very similar to that of precious and indus-
trial metals. One might wonder why the CFTC has not learned from 
the grueling jurisdictional and congressional battles that it has al-
ready once experienced. 
IV.   COMPARISON ISSUE: RETAIL FOREX TRANSACTIONS  
 For the past forty years, the CFTC has been actively regulating 
the retail foreign exchange (“Forex”) industry, which entails a trans-
action in the over-the-counter market very similar to the precious 
and industrial metals transaction at the heart of this Note.84 In fact, 
not only has the CFTC published investor warnings about heavy 
fraud in the industry dating back to the early 1990s, but Gary Gens-
ler, Chairman of the CFTC, once described foreign exchange as “ ‘the 
largest area of retail fraud that the CFTC oversees.’ ”85  
A.   Regulation History of Foreign Exchange Transactions 
 Until the 2000s, trading in Forex markets by public investors was 
effectively unregulated.86 Although there are many types of Forex 
transactions, the facts described in Zelener are typical of a particular 
species that involves a speculative transaction in foreign currency 
where a public investor opens up an account with a brokerage firm.87 
After opening an account, a customer could purchase a desired quan-
tity with the contract calling for a settlement forty-eight hours after 
purchase, but no customer took delivery of the currency.88 The trans-
actions continued to be rolled forward after each settlement, which 
metal transactions at issue here were supposed to have been conducted on a regulated 
exchange”). 
 84. See Izabella Kaminska, New Regulations: Once-Disadvantaged Retail Sector Ex-
pands Quickly, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/042aea96-
e385-11e0-8f47-00144feabdc0.html; see also Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign 
Exchange Transactions and Intermediaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3281, 3283 (proposed Jan. 20, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, & 166).  
 85. Meyer, supra note 23. The article puts current fraud resonating from the Forex 
industry in perspective. Although “forex brokers make up less than 1 per cent of the mem-
bers of the National Futures Association, a self-regulatory body, they were the target of 43 
per cent of the complaints from its business conduct committee in the year end[ing] June 
30[, 2010].” Id.  
 86. See id. 
 87. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 862-63 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 863.  
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kept the customer’s position open.89 If the value of the currency went 
up, the customer could close the position and obtain benefits from a 
positive market movement by selling the amount of currency back to 
the firm.90 The Forex market, like the precious and industrial metals 
market, is characterized as a highly volatile market, which provides 
higher expected returns than most other conventional asset classes.91 
 Similar to the jurisdictional dispute between the CFTC and the 
precious and industrial metals industry, the CFTC once too had a 
jurisdictional dispute between itself and the Forex industry.92 Origi-
nally, the bill creating the CFTC granted it “jurisdiction over on-
exchange trading in futures and options contracts on forex” as well as 
over off-exchange foreign currency transactions.93 The Department of 
the Treasury was concerned about the effect of the bill’s passage “on 
the off-exchange foreign currency . . . market that existed at the time 
between large, institutional customers” and sent a letter to the Sen-
ate Committee “contain[ing] proposed language for the bill which 
would have maintained the status quo for institutional off-exchange 
forex trading.”94 In response to this concern, the bill was amended to 
include this language, which became known as the “Treasury 
Amendment.”95 The Treasury Amendment was challenged in court 
time and time again to determine whether the CFTC had jurisdiction 
over off-exchange retail Forex transactions.96 In Salomon Forex v. 
Tauber, the court held that trading in off-exchange futures and op-
tions was excluded from the CFTC’s regulatory jurisdiction, along 
with spot and forward transactions that involved “sophisticated, 
large-scale foreign currency traders.”97 “Under the Treasury Amend-
ment, retail forex transactions were excluded from the Commission’s 
jurisdiction unless they were conducted on a ‘board of trade.’ ”98 
 Realizing the troubles in interpreting the Treasury Amendment in 
regards to the CFTC’s jurisdiction over retail Forex transactions with 
the general public, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Mod-
ernization Act of 2000, which then expressly permitted off-exchange 
 89. See, e.g., id.  
 90. See, e.g., id.  
 91. Kaminska, supra note 84; see Elaine Moore, Private Investors: Traders Gain from 
Access to Information, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012, 3:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/85887cf4-688a-11e1-b803-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2P2K73nvb. 
 92. See generally Pierre-Louis, supra note 26. 
 93. Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermedi-
aries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3282, 3283 (proposed Jan. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 
4, 5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, & 166). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. (quoting Salomon Forex v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 978 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 98. Id. at 3284. 
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futures contracts as long as the counterparty was one of those enu-
merated in the Act.99 Yet, jurisdiction issues continued as firms be-
gan to offer CFTC-described “look-alike” or “rolling spot” contracts 
that were similar to futures contracts but were (cleverly) labeled 
“spot” transactions.100 
 When the CFTC brought a case against a Forex firm contracting 
with unsophisticated public investors to sell “look-alike” futures 
Forex contracts, the Seventh Circuit in Zelener held the transactions 
to be “spot” contracts and not subject to CFTC regulation, as the 
transaction involved trading in the commodity directly rather than 
trading in the contract itself.101 Furthermore, these transactions did 
not trade on a registered exchange.102 The court discussed that fu-
tures contracts are fungible because they contain “[s]tandard terms 
and an absence of counterparty-specific risk.”103 The court explained 
further that each futures contract calls for delivery of the same prod-
uct at the same place at the same time.104 But, in forward and spot 
contracts, like the current metals transactions that occurred between 
these firms and their customers, the sale is in the actual commodity, 
the contracts are not fungible, and the terms are negotiated.105 As 
such, the court denied CFTC jurisdiction over these products.106 
 Although the court has recognized that off-exchange retail Forex 
transactions labeled as “forward” or “spot” transactions are not sub-
ject to CFTC regulation in some circuits, other circuits have found 
similar non-Forex and Forex transactions to be futures contracts ra-
ther than forward or spot transactions.107 For instance, the Ninth 
Circuit in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co Petro Mar-
keting Group, Inc., held earlier that similar non-Forex transactions to 
those in Zelener were futures contracts that fell under CFTC jurisdic-
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861 
(7th Cir. 2004); Cuccia, supra note 13, at 205 (“In the quest for more lucrative deals, finan-
cial institutions created increasingly sophisticated products. The financial institutions 
could impress their clients with the complexity of the new instruments, and investment 
banks saw a way to make large profits from the growing industry. . . . With new derivative 
instruments created almost every day, the sellers are challenging the ability of buyers to 
stay on top of what they are offered.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 206 n.67 (“ ‘The largely 
unregulated $5 trillion derivatives market may be growing and evolving too fast for even 
diligent regulators to get a harness on it.’ ” (citation omitted)).  
 101. Zelener, 373 F.3d at 867-69. 
 102. See id. at 862-63. 
 103. Id. at 865.  
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. at 865-66.  
 106. Id. at 869.  
 107. See Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Inter-
mediaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3281, 3285 (proposed Jan. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, & 166).  
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tion.108 In holding this way, the court utilized a multifactor test to 
determine whether the contract was a futures contract.109 Later in 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. International Financial 
Services, Inc., the Southern District of New York analyzed a Forex 
transaction using a similar test.110 In looking to the true purpose of 
the transactions, the court found the Forex transactions to be futures 
contracts rather than spot or forward contracts.111  
 In a further effort to combat Forex fraud activities through in-
creased enforcement and public awareness and in an attempt to 
mend the years of jurisdiction issues, Congress passed The CFTC 
Reauthorization Act of 2008.112 This Act modified the CEA by grant-
ing the CFTC the authority to promulgate and enforce fraud regula-
tions in connection with off-exchange retail foreign currency futures, 
options, and options on futures, as well as leveraged off-exchange 
Forex contracts “offered to or entered into with retail customers.”113 
The CFTC was granted jurisdiction to combat fraud in Forex transac-
tions even if the transactions could not be considered futures or op-
tions.114 “Thus, the CRA charges the [CFTC] with regulating specula-
tive forms of retail forex trading, but excludes from the [CFTC]’s 
purview true spot transactions that have a legitimate business pur-
pose or that result in actual delivery.”115 
B.   Dodd-Frank’s Control Over Retail Forex Transactions 
 The Dodd-Frank Act further modified the CEA by requiring that 
all off-exchange retail Forex transactions be conducted under         
the rules of the CFTC.116 This gave the CFTC the ability to promul-
gate recordkeeping, capital and margin, and disclosure rules            
on Forex transactions.117 Congress’s attempt in enacting sections re-
 108. 680 F.2d 573, 580-82 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 109. Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermedi-
aries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3282, 3284-85 (proposed Jan. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, 166); see also Co Petro Marketing Group, 680 F.2d at 576-
81; Pierre-Louis, supra note 26, at 57-59. 
 110. 323 F. Supp. 2d 482, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 111. Id. at 494-98. 
 112. Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermedi-
aries, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3285.  
 113. Id. at 3282, 3285.   
 114. Id. at 3285.  
 115. Id.  
 116. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
 117. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, Q & A – FINAL RETAIL FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE RULES 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/ 
@newsroom/documents/file/forexfinalrule_qa.pdf [hereinafter FOREX Q&A]; see Kaminska, 
supra note 84 (stating that the CFTC introduced stricter rules related to a minimum capi-
tal buffer). 
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lating to Forex transactions in the Dodd-Frank Act was to further 
close loopholes by giving regulatory jurisdiction to a number of       
different regulators.118  
 The rules promulgated by the CFTC (effective October 18, 2010) in 
regulating the Forex industry included registration of various par-
ties, distribution of disclosure documents to customers regarding risk 
and potential conflicts of interest, making and keeping of various rec-
ords, maintenance of prescribed minimum amounts of capital, and 
trading and operational standards.119 The disclosure document rules 
require Forex firms to disclose the percentage of accounts that actu-
ally turn a profit,120 as the vast majority of accounts rarely ever do.121 
Additionally, the recordkeeping requirement mandates firms to 
maintain records of customer complaints.122  
 Most significantly, the CFTC has set leverage parameters as a re-
quirement of those serving as counterparties of retail customers, with 
the parameters being a “2 percent security deposit in the case of ma-
jor currencies and 5 percent of the notional value of the transaction 
for all other currencies.”123 However, despite the large amount of reg-
ulations that have now been promulgated to combat fraud in off-
exchange retail Forex transactions, spanning almost forty years of 
debate, they remain over-the-counter transactions.124  
C.   Effects of Regulation in Forex 
 Although some associated with the Forex industry see the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction and regulation over Forex transactions and the industry 
as a positive, it seems that many other industry participants believe 
the industry has taken a severe hit due to the new regulations.125 De-
spite this disdain toward the regulations, there is some agreement 
among commentators that the CFTC has met its purpose for enacting 
 118. See Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Inter-
mediaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,410, 55,410 (Sept. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 
4, 5, 10, 140, 145, 147, 160, & 166); FOREX Q&A, supra note 117, at 1; Meyer, supra note 
23. 
 119. See FOREX Q&A, supra note 117; Foley & Lardner, supra note 116; Kaminska, 
supra note 84. 
 120. Meyer, supra note 23. 
 121. Stephen L. Bernard, Is Currency Trading Worth the Risk?, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 
2011),  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304665904576384111852016334 
(“Only about 30% of all retail forex trades are profitable.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. FOREX Q&A, supra note 117, at 3. 
 124. See PARAMESWARAN, supra note 3, at 15-16.  
 125. See, e.g., Kaminska, supra note 84; Adam Kritzer, New CFTC Forex Regulations 
Unpopular, but Worthwhile, FOREX BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.forexblog.org/ 
2010/01/new-cftc-forex-regulations-unpopular-but-worthwhile.html. 
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the regulation.126 The CFTC effectively cleaned up the Forex “streets” 
and combated much of the fraud in the industry, likely by sending 
fraud merchants out of business.127 Glenn Stevens, chief executive    
of Gain Capital, a U.S. based company that hosts an online Forex 
trading website, said, “[The CFTC] is getting the rules down on     
paper, because they’ve realised, ‘If we don’t delineate the rules, they 
get bent.’ ”128 
 However, does the regulation provide too much oversight? After 
all, the Forex industry is a $3700 billion-a-day market with the retail 
public making up $125 billion of that market.129 It is a small chunk of 
the overall financial market, about ten percent,130 but pessimists be-
lieve that percentage that is falling rapidly.131 The ambiguities in the 
law and legal battles that ensued between the Forex industry and the 
CFTC increased the costs for those involved in the Forex market.132 
As a result, when the relevant regulations became active in 2010, the 
number of registered foreign exchange dealers dropped significantly.133  
 Furthermore, the new leverage buffer has also reduced the num-
ber of Forex transactions executed by brokers, as retail clients de-
sired the high leverage that previously unregulated Forex brokers 
could provide them.134 Evidencing this investor outrage, the CFTC 
received a record number of comment letters from Forex investors in 
response to their proposed rules—9100 letters to be exact.135 Inves-
tors complained about one specific proposal, the now-imposed cap     
on leverage.136  
 Industry brokerage firms believe the harsh and rapid influx of 
regulation on the Forex industry caused negative impacts on its 
 126. See Kaminska, supra note 84; Meyer, supra note 23. 
 127. See Kaminska, supra note 84. 
 128. Meyer, supra note 22. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Kaminska, supra note 84. 
 131. Wanfeng Zhou, Retail Investors in U.S. Retreat from Currency Trading, REUTERS 
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/22/markets-forex-retailfx-
idUSL1N0AR9F220130122.  
 132. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 133. See Meyer, supra note 23 (noting that when the National Futures Association 
imposed minimum capital requirements on Forex firms already registered with the self-
regulatory organization in 2010, the NFA saw a sharp drop in registered Forex firms from 
forty-one firms to seventeen); Paul Murphy, Time for Regulator to Move on Retail FX Trad-
ing, FIN. TIMES (July 13, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93a462f2-cd03-11e1-b78b-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2yEK8WABF (explaining that after the CFTC 
imposed regulations on Forex firms, several firms moved to London, where Forex trading is 
“largely unregulated”). 
 134. See Kaminska, supra note 84. 
 135. Meyer, supra note 23. 
 136. Id.  
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growth.137 For example, chief executive Drew Niv of FXCM, a retail 
Forex dealer, stated in September 2011: 
‘The foreign exchange dealer category has become the most heavily 
encumbered type of financial market firm today, from a regulatory 
perspective . . . . That’s why you’ve seen a huge shrinkage in the 
industry. There are now dozens of names, instead of hundreds. . . . 
It’s been a regulatory earthquake, and in the next year you will see 
more aftershocks and more firms going out of business . . . .’138 
 Since the regulations have imposed so many added costs to the 
OTC market, much of the business has fled overseas where regula-
tion over this market is less prevalent,139 a fear of the CFTC during 
proposal of the regulations.140 A United States public investor may 
now prefer to open a Forex account overseas and transact with for-
eign businesses, thus “circumventing the new regulations, in particu-
lar the leverage restrictions.”141 The downside: more American busi-
ness being shipped overseas and less American jobs.142  
 However, some other long-term positives that the Forex industry 
has noticed from the regulation of the industry are an eventual in-
creased market share, a stable group of customers, a wider customer 
base, less detriment to previous high-leverage customers, more 
knowledgeable participants, competitive prices to the wider market, 
increased technological tools to the market such as retail platforms, 
automatic trading between customer and vendors, institutional in-
vestors becoming brokers, large banks now selling to the retail sector, 
and increased investor protection.143 
V.   REGULATING THE PRECIOUS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS INDUSTRY  
 Many theorists have proposed approaches to efficient regulation of 
the securities market. Specifically, some theorists believe that mar-
kets are efficient within themselves and regulation is not needed in 
order for the market to function appropriately.144 Others have sug-
gested various alternative schemes in place of the current method of 
 137. See, e.g., Kaminska, supra note 84. 
 138. Id.  
 139. See Murphy, supra note 133.  
 140. Kritzer, supra note 125; Meyer, supra note 23. 
 141. See Kristina Zucchi, The Pros and Cons of Trading Forex in an Overseas Account, 
INVESTOPEDIA (May 27, 2011), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/11/trading-forex-
overseas-account.asp. 
 142. See Murphy, supra note 133.  
 143. Kaminska, supra note 84. 
 144. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1454 
(1997). 
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regulation, especially in the area of unregulated OTC derivatives.145 
This Note will first establish that regulation through an exchange is 
infeasible in this industry. Nevertheless, this Note will argue that, 
like in Forex, CFTC jurisdiction is essential and some direct govern-
ment regulation of precious and industrial metals is needed in order 
to protect consumers. Specifically, this Note will propose and analyze 
support for regulation, such as the inability of the retail consumer to 
protect himself, the lack of incentive for dealers to self-regulate, and 
the failure of a proposed exchange as a regulator. However, although 
some regulation is needed due to the level of unsophistication in the 
retail investors, too much regulation will have the negative effect of 
overregulation of the industry. 
A.   The Failure of an Exchange as a Regulator 
 The CFTC suggests that the industry has violated the law because 
the product has never been executed on an exchange, but the CFTC 
fails to state what exchange exists that would adequately provide 
proper housing for this product.146 As discussed, this transaction is 
over-the-counter, meaning it is not executed on an exchange nor has 
it ever been. The CFTC alludes to a “board of trade” and states that 
the metals industry has failed to conduct its transaction “subject to 
the rules of a board of trade that has been designated or registered by 
the Commission as a contract market.”147 In making this reference to 
a board of trade, the CFTC is ultimately suggesting that this transac-
tion was required to trade in the same manner as a futures contract, 
as all standardized futures are conducted on a board of trade.  
 Under an exchange, “intermediaries trade securities pursuant to a 
common set of rules.”148 Some debate that securities that are execut-
ed on exchange are thereby regulated to the point that further inter-
vention by the government is not needed.149 For example, an ex-
change, by itself, creates liquidity, competition, disclosure, uniform 
format for the presentation of information, and incentive to adopt 
rules in the market.150  
 145. See generally Cohen, supra note 2 (discussing three different regulatory proposals 
for derivatives); Cuccia, supra note 13 (proposing derivative regulation at the institutional 
level including various disclosures to protect dealers, end-users, and shareholders); 
D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 13 (proposing a regulatory system that would in-
clude the enforcement by the CFTC and the SEC).  
 146. Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 1; Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, su-
pra note 27, ¶ 7 n.3.  
 147. Id. ¶¶ 29, 109.   
 148. Mahoney, supra note 144, at 1457.  
 149. See id. at 1455-57.  
 150. See id. at 1457-59.  
                                                                                                                                        
820  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:799 
 
 Although the dispute regarding whether this product is a futures 
contract has not been fully decided on by the courts, it is likely that 
even a “look-alike” futures ruling granting the CFTC jurisdiction over 
these transactions would eliminate them because inherent character-
istics of the transactions arguably preclude them from being executed 
on a board of trade. Execution of this product on an exchange is not 
feasible because the product is not standardized, as is true of all OTC 
derivatives.151 The customers contract for varying price, quantity, 
settlement dates, delivery, and financing.152 Therefore, an exchange 
would not effectively regulate this industry, as an exchange requires 
that each contract be standardized in order for it to function appro-
priately. Regulating this investment product by placing it on an ex-
change is impracticable and unfeasible. However, as evidenced by the 
Forex industry, the precious and industrial metals transaction can 
still be regulated in other ways while remaining an OTC transaction.  
B.  The Inability of the Consumer to Protect Himself 
 Although it is argued that regulation is unnecessary for rational 
investors with good information, the industry here enters into trans-
actions with average persons, deemed retail investors, which is the 
key difference between this proposal and others that have denounced 
regulation of OTC derivatives generally.153 As has been previously 
recognized, even institutional investors lack the necessary infor-
mation when entering into derivative OTC transactions with broker-
ing banks; as such, the informational asymmetry that occurs between 
the industry participants and the everyday retail investor transpires 
at a much larger scale and to the detriment of the retail investor, re-
gardless of the investor’s rationality.154  
1.   The Nature of the Retail Dealer as Salesman 
 First, the dealer is a sales-based business and thereby earns profit 
based off of the volume of trades made by clients and executed by 
brokers of the firm. In fact, the salesmanship aspect behind this 
transaction might not be much different than OTC derivative trans-
actions that occur between large institutional investors and invest-
ment banks.155 If Fortune 500 companies, with abundant resources 
 151. Cuccia, supra note 13, at 201-02.  
 152. See, e.g., Hunter Wise Motion to Dismiss, supra note 27, ¶¶ 75-77. 
 153. See generally Cohen, supra note 2; Mahoney, supra note 144. 
 154. See generally Cuccia, supra note 13 (explaining that informational asymmetry 
occurs when one contracting party has more information than the other). 
 155. See id. at 205 (“However, the huge sums of money the Wall Street banks would 
make—as well as the contracts’ less obvious, but nevertheless devastating, risks—were 
omitted from the investment banks’ sales pitch.”). 
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available to them, cannot protect themselves from salesmen, how can 
one expect an unsophisticated retail investor to have enough infor-
mation to steer clear of high-pressure sales tactics? Dealers induce 
clients to invest by portraying the investment as “high-return” with 
little to no risk.156 However, due in part to some of the qualities of the 
investment, such as high volatility or the use of leverage, the vast 
majority of clients lose money relatively quickly when investing in 
precious and industrial metals.157 Unfortunately, due to the excellent 
salesmanship of those employed and trained by the dealers, retail 
investors all too often lunge at a deal that is too good to be true; a 
deal too good to be true only because the investor knows no better.  
2.   The Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Retail Dealers and 
Brokers 
 Further, due to the fact that the industry lacks any regulation or 
enforcement regarding broker actions in soliciting such investments, 
investors are unknowingly struck by the moral hazard problem when 
brokers fraudulently induce a trade with the mere incentive of rais-
ing commission funds for self-profit.158 Although some brokers may 
believe that they are making informed and skillful decisions for the 
client, the reality is that even brokers who have a reasonable basis in 
making trading decisions often fail to give the client all of the infor-
mation necessary in order for the client to make a knowledgeable de-
cision to enter into the transaction. Instead, an investor naively fails 
to realize the repercussions of listening to his agent broker, and the 
risk and costs of an investment are shifted from the broker to the re-
tail investor when disclosure is not required as a precursor to the re-
tail investor authorizing trades. After selling the investment, brokers 
and dealers bear little of the risk if the retail investor loses all of his 
invested capital. But, had there been regulatory oversight in the form 
of mandated disclosure to the investor, the broker and dealer would 
have behaved differently, as they would have exposed themselves to 
the risks of entering into a transaction without providing proper noti-
fication to the client. Additionally, the client too will bear some of the 
 156. See id. at 208-09. This is assuming that high-pressure sales tactics are the worst 
that can happen, which is in fact untrue. However, even institutional investors are inten-
tionally deceived. Id. One bank salesman selling an OTC derivative investment to Proctor 
and Gamble admitted that he set the company up. Id. at 209. Another said: “ ‘Funny busi-
ness, you know? Lure people into that calm and then just totally f— ’em.’ ” Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 81-84. 
 158. See Definition of ‘Moral Hazard,’ INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/m/moralhazard.asp (last visited June 22, 2014) (defining “moral hazard” as “[t]he 
risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good faith, has pro-
vided misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an incen-
tive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the contract      
settles”).  
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risk, if properly disclosed, as the client will have made the trade 
knowingly and likely without fraudulent inducement when the con-
tract portrays clear standards for the trade.159  
3.  The Unsophistication of the Retail Investor and Adverse           
Selection 
 The type of investors targeted for these types of transaction are 
unsophisticated investors who lack conception of just how complex 
and risky derivatives can be. As derivatives historically were only 
used by institutional investors as a hedge against risk,160 most aver-
age investors are unfamiliar with the various types of derivatives and 
how the markets operate. Scarily, even brokers working at the top of 
the chain selling investments to institutional investors have trouble 
understanding the sophisticated derivative product.161 Those with 
knowledge in derivatives are unlikely to invest in these types of OTC 
derivatives without attesting to the fact that such an investment is a 
mere gamble in the markets, especially when they are not afforded 
any credible information regarding the investment. Truthful and 
credible information is impossible to discern from untruthful, unreli-
able information, creating a source of information asymmetry before 
the parties’ contract, when there is no regulatory body monitoring 
what is portrayed to retail investors by these, frequently, mere 
salesmen.162 With that being said, brokerage firms and especially 
fraud merchants selling interests in metals find their most likely cus-
tomers in the most unsophisticated types of investors—often times, 
the elderly and all-around novice investors.163 
 159. See, e.g., Taylor Woodrow Homes Fla., Inc. v. 4/46-A Corp., 850 So. 2d 536, 542-43 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (stating that “the courts have held that a party may not recover in 
fraud for an alleged false statement when proper disclosure of the truth is subsequently 
revealed in a written agreement between the parties”); Advanced Mktg. Sys. Corp. v. ZK 
Yacht Sales, 830 So. 2d 924, 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (determining that promissory estop-
pel was inappropriate because the parties had a written contract, which covered the    
commissions).  
 160. See Cuccia, supra note 13, at 199. 
 161. Id. at 206 (“ ‘[S]ome of the most sophisticated asset managers in the nation don’t 
properly understand derivatives which is why there’ve been such huge and unexpected 
losses.’ If someone selling the derivatives does not fully comprehend them, one wonders 
how a buyer can adequately assess the complexity and risks of these instruments.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 162. See id. at 198 (“It may be that potential investors are irrational, or that they ‘are 
systematically given misleading and biased information and have no ability to evaluate its 
inaccuracies.’ ”). See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncer-
tainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970).  
 163. Burstein, supra note 4. 
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4.   The Inadequacy of State Law Causes of Action 
 Retail investors wronged by fraud merchants lack the ability to 
take their claims to federal court when there is an absence of federal 
statutory authority or regulation over the industry. However, those 
that invest in a wide variety of other regulated instruments have 
many anti-fraud provisions and regulations under which the investor 
can sue for relief. It is true that investors have state remedy claims 
such as breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
lack of authority, and breach of contract available to them, but at 
least one commentator has rejected the adequacy of bringing claims 
under the common law.164 The drawbacks from resolving disputes 
under state common law, or state statutes derived from the common 
law, include a lack of precedent in the area, difficult facts to ascertain 
and describe accurately, and muddled opinions from confused, untu-
tored judges regarding the complex transaction.165 As state law 
claims do not provide suitable avenues by investors against fraud 
merchants in this industry, some federal regulation is necessary to at 
least protect aggrieved investors from getting taken by those that 
target the unsophisticated. Additionally, it is likely that when an in-
vestor has the federal judicial avenue available to him, many fraud 
merchants will cease to exist because such industry participants will 
be unable to use the law as a shield to avoid wronged investors. For 
the reasons mentioned, retail investors are not able to protect them-
selves in this transaction, and the precious and industrial metals in-
dustry necessitates regulatory oversight.  
C.   Current Lack of Industry Disclosure and the Non-Existent          
Incentive for Dealers to Self-Disclose  
 As an unregulated market targeting unsophisticated investors, 
the industry lacks meaningful disclosure in all aspects of its business 
model and product.166 Further, any optional disclosure a dealer firm 
does make to its investors can be untruthful or misleading. One thing 
is true—in the end, every party has more information about the 
product than the retail investor,167 and regulation is needed to alter 
that status quo.  
 As to other regulated securities markets, it is argued that regulat-
ed disclosure is not necessary because disclosure works on a copycat, 
 164. Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. 
J. INT’L. ECON. L. 421, 447-78 (2001). 
 165. Id.  
 166. Cuccia, supra note 13, at 206. 
 167. Id. at 207. 
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unraveling method.168 Each firm ultimately chooses to disclose unre-
quired information as a method to combat competition.169 Such firms 
will ultimately disclose necessary information in an effort to gain in-
creased market share, with each firm following in the other’s foot-
steps.170 However, this argument is not plausible when it comes to a 
completely unregulated industry riddled with fraud, as the fraud 
merchants have the same goal as one another and ultimately lack the 
survival impulse of a legitimate firm. The competition, ultimately, 
regards who can defraud or “sell” their customers better by looking as 
attractive as possible without incurring costs. As for those firms at-
tempting to run a legitimate business, they fall into a competition 
war with the fraud merchants and neglect to disclose as well, as 
there is no incentive for these firms to increase their transaction 
costs when such costs fail to produce value. In other words, legiti-
mate merchants are forced to keep their costs competitive with fraud 
merchants in order to keep up in the industry and thereby disclose 
information up to the point that a fraud merchant would disclose, 
which is often negligible in comparison to the risk involved in the in-
vestment. Investors cannot easily discern whether any further disclo-
sure regarding the transaction by fraud merchants is beneficially 
truthful information or if the disclosure is simply fraudulent lies.  
 Because the goals of increased sales and low transaction costs are 
forcefully aligned between industry participants, not only do fraud 
merchants lack the need and justification to send forged credible   
signals of their “trustworthiness” to investors, thereby provoking   
the unraveling effect of disclosure, but any credible signal attempted 
to be displayed to investors by rightful firms often lacks any rele-
vance. Retail investors, not realizing the difference between a fraud 
merchant and a legitimate dealer, are simply sold on the sales    
technique of the firm, rather than the amount or sufficiency of the 
disclosure that the firm produces.171 Further, even if an investor feels 
as if one firm has provided him with better disclosure information 
than another, many times the investor is unable to decipher a truth-
ful disclosure rather than a fraudulent statement from a smooth-
talking broker.172 
 For example, one of the biggest areas lacking disclosure is in re-
gards to the processes of the transaction itself. In almost all instanc-
es, retail investors believe that they are dealing with the dealer di-
 168. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure 
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (discussing firm incentives for 
firms to disclose information themselves rather than as required by regulation).  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Akerlof, supra note 162, at 495-96.  
 172. Id.  
                                                                                                                                        
2014]  RETAIL INVESTMENTS 825 
 
rectly as the sole intermediary between the retail investor and the 
depository where their metal is ultimately held.173 Many times, the 
dealers portray to investors that they will store the investor’s metal 
in a depository, potentially misleading the unsophisticated investor 
that their investment is safe in a depository owned or run by the re-
tail dealer itself.174 However, little does the investor know that the 
firm has failed to disclose or has even misrepresented the fact that 
there can be as many as two or three other intermediaries, or coun-
terparties, between the retail investor and the source of metal, each 
charging incremental fees along the way.175 This lack of infor-
mation—due to the absence of disclosure regulation requiring other-
wise—creates a detrimental informational asymmetry to the retail 
investor, where he lacks the necessary information to make an in-
formed decision on whether the investment meets his personal 
goals.176 Knowing this information, some investors may forego this 
type of investment because the potential increased returns are not 
worth the risk or they feel that the fees charged along the way are 
too high given the services provided. Had the retail investor known 
that his product had been marked up to prices much higher than an 
institutional investor would be paying, he might have opted to take 
his funds to a different market with a product that charges less fees, 
incurs less risk, and provides a reduced rate of return. Furthermore, 
this information is never disclosed by fraud merchants or even firms 
with honest business practices because the investment is solicited 
profitably despite the lack of disclosure, transaction costs are kept 
lower without the forced regulation, firms compete through the use of 
sales tactics rather than through credibility, and unsophisticated in-
vestors continue to fall for the investment without objection due to 
their inability to determine just disclosures from fraud. Such misin-
formation communicated between the principal and agent in this 
transaction leads one to the solution that an informational asym-
metry problem between the parties could be cured by disclosure 
methods as a source of regulation in this industry.177    
 173. See, e.g., Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 32.  
 174. Commission Advisory: Beware of Promises of Easy Profits From Buying Precious 
Metals and Other Commodities, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,  
http://www.cftc.gov/enf/00orders/enfposting5-metals.htm (last visited June 22, 2014) [here-
inafter CFTC Metals Advisory]. 
 175. See Hunter Wise Complaint, supra note 26, ¶¶ 33-34 (detailing the different fees 
each intermediary charges on the transaction before the investment reaches the retail 
dealer). 
 176. See Cuccia, supra note 13, at 207 (“In an OTC contract, the dealer has more in-
formation than the end-user . . . .”).   
 177. Id. at 215 (“It is no secret that requiring mandatory disclosure aids in correcting 
the problems caused by informational asymmetry.”). 
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 Dealers and wholesalers in the precious and industrial metals in-
dustry lack the incentive to self-regulate for a number of reasons, but 
at the forefront of discussion is the problem of collective action when 
the industry as a whole fails to self-disclose by providing disclosure 
voluntarily. First, as previously discussed, the income obtained by 
the broker from its clients is strictly commission-based thereby in-
centivizing brokers, as sole communicators with the customers, to 
“seal the deal” despite what informal limits may have been placed on 
them by the dealer.178 Unfortunately, and unsurprisingly, principals 
of the dealer firms and trainers of their brokers coach their sales per-
sonnel to use sales tactics to sign up customers quickly and provide 
customers with generic disclosures, if any, which are replicated by 
each dealer in the tight knit industry.179  
 While there may be some incentive for some dealer firms to self-
disclose in order to create a better reputation for the negatively 
viewed industry amongst sophisticated investors and other financial 
industry providers, there is even less incentive for a wholesaler in the 
industry to provide disclosure as wholesalers’ sole marketing is to 
retail dealers rather than to investors.180 As discussed earlier, inves-
tors rarely know about the wholesaler’s relationship to their invest-
ment. For that reason, wholesalers simply have to look credible 
enough to the retail dealers in order to be successful. Many times, 
self-regulatory measures such as disclosure to retail dealers are un-
necessary as a wholesaler’s appearance to dealers is one of high-
sophistication due to the technological and accounting practices uti-
lized by wholesalers to keep track of inventory amongst their various 
dealer clients.181 Dealers, for the most part, lack most of the modern 
technology utilized by today’s regulated industries, such as real time 
pricing, online portals, and complex spreadsheet and accounting 
analysis and rely on wholesalers to provide the like.182 Oftentimes, it 
is likely that such bells and whistles of the wholesaler are enough for 
dealers to sign-up without questioning the details behind the metal 
 178. See discussion supra Part V.B.1. 
 179. CFTC Metals Advisory, supra note 174. 
 180. E.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, 
LLC, No. 12-81311-CIV, 2013 WL 718503, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013) (“Hunter Wise 
is the conductor of this orchestra, with the other Defendants playing instruments at 
Hunter Wise’s direction. Hunter Wise recruits and engages intermediaries and sales firms, 
such as the Lloyds Defendants (an intermediary) and the Dealer Defendants (sales firms), 
to solicit retail customers to purchase physical metals on a financed basis.” (footnotes   
omitted)). 
 181. See id. at *5-6. 
 182. See id. Although the dealer could potentially provide itself with additional tech-
nology or revert to providing its own technology to clients, a dealer provided with resources 
by the wholesaler is unlikely to duplicate any assets provided to it as the costs of doing so 
will likely exceed the benefit—especially due to the fact that wholesalers are receiving 
some of the proceeds of the transaction in order to provide such services.  
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transactions on the wholesaler’s end since a substantial portion of the 
start-up costs of the company are taken care of by the wholesaler.183  
 As most actors in the industry forego self-regulation, the few deal-
ers that do try to implement some components of self-regulation, 
such as disclosure, are left in the dust by the rest of the industry 
when transaction costs of self-regulation increase to the point that 
the profit to the firms and its clients diminish.184 Those who may op-
tionally choose to self-regulate are forced to limit any self-regulation 
in order to stay competitive in the marketplace. Additionally, without 
the use of self-regulation, dealers are still able to obtain a profitable 
level of business by the utilization of high-pressure sales techniques 
on the public. If disclosure were indeed profitable for the dealer, the 
firm would provide for it, but it does not.185 The time, effort, and 
money required to self-regulate therefore fails to gather the momen-
tum necessary to make disclosure a priority to the entire industry. 
Hence, the answer is simple: when it comes to self-regulation, retail 
dealers in precious and industrial metals take the “why bother?” atti-
tude due to the collective action problem amongst the industry partic-
ipants. As one dealer remains profitable without the added costs, the 
others notice and follow along in the “why bother?” attitude.  
D.   Just Enough Regulation: Disclosure Only Regulation 
 Proposed here is a solution rooted in a public interest theory186 
approach to regulation that meets the goal of the CFTC in eradicat-
ing fraudulent practices, the objectives of the retail investor in choos-
ing an investment in precious and industrial metals, and the safe-
guards necessary to provide investors with tools for informed deci-
sion-making. The solution takes into account the newly heavily regu-
lated Forex industry and proposes that some regulation is appropri-
ate for an investment in precious and industrial metals at the retail 
level, but that other regulation should not be imposed as to denature 
the investment from its categorization as an OTC contract.  
 Retail investors who find themselves investing in this product, 
whether fraudulently induced or not, do so for one reason: the poten-
tial for a high rate of return on their investment. Investors who are 
investing for other reasons would invest and use a more risk-averse 
strategy by placing their funds in other securities, such as bonds or 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 168, at 673-74. 
 185. See id. at 683.  
 186. J. Harold Mulherin, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Conceptual 
Issues in Securities Markets, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 421, 422 (2007) (“The public interest theory is 
the traditional statement that regulation responds to market failure as an attempt to im-
prove social welfare.”). 
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mutual funds.187 Given these types of investors, it is likely that the 
full range of regulation over this investment vehicle will adversely 
affect investor goals in placing their money with precious and indus-
trial metals firms, as evidenced by the recent regulation of the Forex 
industry.188 Increased transaction costs associated with a heavily 
regulated security will likely thwart the efforts of these investors as 
some, if not all, of the costs associated with the increased regulation 
would pass down to the retail investors in the spread of the invest-
ment.189 Some investors would likely be discouraged from investing 
in this hypothetically highly-regulated product because coupled with 
the extreme volatility of the product, lower rates of returns would not 
be worth the severe risk such investments pose. Therefore, the trans-
action costs involved in fully regulating this industry will likely fore-
close much of the investor base currently investing in precious and 
industrial metals. 
 To the extent that more regulation is promulgated and imple-
mented, enforcement costs for investigative, prosecutorial, and judi-
cial staffs increase.190 As the CFTC has previously regulated the 
Forex industry containing a product and problems much similar to 
those in the metals industry, it is important that the CFTC learn 
from the regulation instituted in the Forex industry.191 It is asserted 
that the CFTC, combined with efforts of the National Futures Asso-
ciation,192 has over-regulated the Forex industry to the detriment of 
the retail public investors, the taxpayers, the brokerage firms, and 
the United States economy.193 The CFTC must better balance the 
benefits of eliminating fraud with the foregoing detriment to partici-
pants of the industry, and in doing so, it must first avoid sending 
reputable business out of the country. Some regulation is enough to 
combat fraud merchants from continuing business as the cost of im-
plementing regulation and registration alone would disinterest these 
business owners from continuing in this industry nationally rather 
than moving on.194 Investors are forced to take their funds overseas 
in Forex transactions because investors will only accept the increased 
cost of regulation up to the point that the cost begins to exceed the 
 187. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 168, at 676-77.  
 188. See FOREX Q&A, supra note 117 (detailing the full range of Forex regulation). 
 189. See Meyer, supra note 23. 
 190. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 168, at 678. 
 191. Kaminska, supra note 84; Meyer, supra note 22. 
 192. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, http://www.nfa.futures.org (last visited June 22, 
2014) (“National Futures Association (NFA) is the industrywide, self-regulatory organiza-
tion for the U.S. futures industry. NFA strives every day to safeguard market integrity, 
protect investors and help our Members meet their regulatory responsibilities.”). 
 193. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 194. See, e.g., Kaminska, supra note 84.  
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need for protection.195 As represented in the case of Forex, many 
dealers and investors found that the more attractive option post-
regulation was to bring their business overseas as these participants 
likely felt the costs of business exceeded their need for protection.196 
Hence, regulation should be limited to the point where transaction 
costs allow for efficient operation of business within the borders of 
the United States but remain high enough to keep fraud merchants 
from entering the business.  
 In this intermediate proposal of regulation, the main focus should 
be on giving public retail investors the necessary information to 
make value-maximizing decisions on their own behalf. In doing so, I 
propose that the only set of regulations required to keep the industry 
viable, yet do so within operation of equitable principles, is through 
the use of disclosure regulations.197 It is acknowledged that finding 
just the right amount of regulation is a difficult feat,198 so in this pro-
posal, the minimum amount of regulation is suggested with the cave-
at that an analysis should be undertaken in due time after the im-
plementation of the regulation to determine the regulation’s effec-
tiveness on industry-wide fraud. Further implementation of regula-
tions is always available if the proposal has not reduced the level of 
fraud to a common level found in other areas of regulated securities. 
With that said, the reader should acknowledge that complete eradi-
cation of bad actors is an impossible achievement in any industry, 
but disclosure regulation will most likely provide a tolerable level of 
industry fraud, thereby protecting the vast majority of consumers 
investing at the retail level. The following paragraphs propose the 
areas of these transactions that require disclosure regulation by the 
CFTC when, rather than if, jurisdiction is granted to the CFTC over 
these transactions by the court. The CFTC, having the most expertise 
in the derivatives market, is an adequate regulatory agency to han-
dle such a task and should be the entity to delegate action to other 
regulatory parties as it sees fit.  
 The regulatory focus should be on disclosure at the retail dealer 
level due to the high-risk, high-volatility, and high-leverage associat-
ed with the transaction. By proposing the regulation of firms at the 
bottom, wholesalers and institutions will be required to provide suffi-
cient information to dealers without the use of mandatory disclosure 
in order to be able to viably solicit such dealers. Simple disclosure 
 195. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 168, at 696; Zucchi, supra note 141. 
 196. See Kritzer, supra note 125; Zucchi, supra note 141. 
 197. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 168, at 669 (explaining that the securities laws 
have “two basic components: a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure 
when securities are issued and periodically thereafter”). 
 198. Id. (“The notorious complexities of securities practice arise from defining the de-
tails of disclosure.”). 
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regulations at the retail level would cure many of the mismatches 
between dealer and retail investor previously discussed, such as the 
detrimental informational asymmetry problem to retail investors, the 
moral hazard problem produced by brokers, and adverse selection 
issues associated with the industry participants.199 Furthermore, as 
evidenced by the vast disclosure regulations in other securities in-
dustries, a consensus throughout the nation seems to be that con-
sumers deserve and desire to know exactly what they are allocating 
valuable resources toward, despite the added costs.200 Due to collec-
tive action problems amongst industry participants at different levels 
and the failure of the unraveling method, retail dealers have no in-
tention to disclose truthful and complete information to their retail 
customers on their own accord; thus, the only feasible way to provide 
thorough information to consumers is through mandatory disclosure 
requirements.201   
 Although it may be argued that disclosure regulations are some of 
the most costly to implement by the firm and the monitoring by the 
regulatory agency also provides increased taxpayer costs, it must be 
acknowledged that limiting regulation to simply disclosure regula-
tions cuts costs greatly to both parties if viewed in comparison to the 
full wide-range of regulations that were implemented in the Forex 
industry.202 Strictly limiting regulation to mandatory disclosure re-
quirements means that the costs of regulations regarding minimum 
capitalization requirements, leverage ratios, registration, and exces-
sive monitoring will limit costs to taxpayers, consumers, and indus-
try participants. Additionally, the standardization of mandatory dis-
closure will reduce, in due time, transaction costs associated with the 
initial shock to the industry that regulation often delivers.203 Fur-
thermore, I propose that the costs that pass down to the consumer 
through disclosure would be subsumed by the retail investor as a cost 
of doing business in the area because the investor is able to make 
more informed decisions regarding investments in precious and     
industrial metals.  
 Some of the most important types of disclosures that should be 
mandatorily distributed to retail investors prior to opening an ac-
 199. See id. at 680 (“A mandatory disclosure system substantially limits firms’ ability 
to remain silent.”); see also discussion supra Part V.B–C.  
 200. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047-48 (1995). 
 201. Id. at 1048 (“Disclosure can contribute to informational efficiency (and ultimately 
to social welfare) by enabling traders to gather information, and thereby reflect new infor-
mation in prices, at a reduced cost compared to a world without disclosure.”).  
 202. FOREX Q&A, supra note 117. 
 203. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 168, at 687 (“Mandatory disclosure rules 
promulgated by the government are one means to achieve standardization, but it does not 
follow that mandatory disclosure is necessary.”). 
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count with a retail dealer are risk disclosures.204 These investments 
pose a variety of risks at the institutional level, which are passed 
down to retail investors.205 Disclosures regarding the high level of 
risk involved in OTC derivative contracts, as well as the volatility 
often found in the market, are imperative to investors in making in-
formed decisions and limiting the dealer salesmen’s ability to down-
play such risks involved. The risk disclosures should be standardized 
across the industry and developed through the CFTC to limit dealers 
from downplaying investor risk using sales tactics.  
 A big part of the increased risk in these investments is the deal-
er’s push for retail investors to buy a metal position using leverage. 
Not only do some of these investors fail to understand the vast reper-
cussions associated with increasing their purchasing power, as the 
thought of an even greater return using the grandiose sounding term 
“purchasing power” seems superb at the time, but many investors do 
not realize the further increased risk associated with the use as lev-
erage.206 Not only could a retail investor lose his invested capital, but 
he could end up owing additional funds to cover the loan and fees. 
Included in the risk disclosures should be detailed statements about 
the process of leverage, including real time examples and hypothet-
ical scenarios regarding the effects leverage can have positively and 
negatively on an investor.207 By educating investors on the use of lev-
erage associated with their transactions, regulation instituting lever-
age caps becomes repetitive and unnecessary when investors are in-
formed adequately about the repercussions. Furthermore, as many 
investors optionally choose to invest in derivatives and precious and 
industrial metals for the potential benefits of high leverage associat-
ed with these transactions, providing any further regulation limiting 
leverage devoices investors of their aspirations by inhibiting an in-
vestor’s autonomy in making educated decisions regarding the use of 
his personal funds. 
 Additionally, the industry should disclose operational standards 
informing investors of the processes of the business, how metal could 
 204. To discuss derivatives’ risks does not mean they are bad. “Indeed, because deriva-
tives present risks and benefits, they have been compared to electricity—‘dangerous if mis-
handled but bearing the potential to do tremendous good.’ ” Cuccia, supra note 13, at 201. 
 205. See generally Cohen, supra note 2, at 2006-13 (discussing the various risks associ-
ated with derivatives). 
 206. See STAFF OF S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, supra note 24, at 2, 6-8. 
 207. See, e.g., Cuccia, supra note 13, at 216. As an example, at the institutional level, 
the Federal Reserve Board has previously entered into an agreement with a bank requiring 
that the bank “shall conduct its leveraged derivatives transactions business in a manner 
which seeks to reasonably ensure that each leverage derivatives transaction customer has 
the capability to understand the nature and material terms, conditions and risks of any 
leveraged derivatives transaction entered into with the customer.” Id. (citation and quota-
tion marks omitted).  
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be stored at any number of multiple depositories, and how their met-
als are performing in the market using a system displaying real-time 
quotes. Included in these operational disclosures should be fee disclo-
sures listing the mark-up percentage from each intermediary associ-
ated with the transactions.208 By providing fee disclosures to inves-
tors, not only are investors able to make more rational decisions re-
garding the transactions, but it will also help limit the extreme infla-
tion of mark-up fees that oftentimes occurs between the spot price of 
the metal, keeping the actors competitive all the while.209  
 Furthermore, disclosure regarding trustworthiness of brokers 
hired by retail dealers should be implemented. Negative history re-
garding financial industry violations should be revealed to retail in-
vestors who are relying on the word of a “salesman” entrusted with 
large sums of investor funds. Including this disclosure would also aid 
in correcting the moral hazard problem that occurs between broker 
and investor as brokers will be held accountable for their actions 
with the retail dealer by, in the interest of competition, limiting the 
number of “scam artists” used to solicit investments. Such a disclo-
sure would also alleviate most of the need for registration by brokers, 
as a goal of registration is often to determine the adequacy of the 
broker in order to protect consumers. 
 Finally, with all this required disclosure, someone is needed to 
make sure it meets standards of accuracy. The CFTC is in the best 
position to either monitor dealer disclosures on their own or to essen-
tially contract the duty out to another agency, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission, or a self-regulatory body, such as the National 
Futures Association. Monitoring of disclosures should take place at 
the inception of a precious and industrial metals firm and then an-
nually, as long as the firm does not change the materials sent to cus-
tomers. Additionally, the agency in charge of monitoring should con-
tinuously conduct routine and random policing investigations to en-
sure that disclosure materials submitted are the same as those that 
make their way to consumer investors, bringing anti-fraud actions 
where necessary. Such policing actions would alleviate the need to re-
quire more frequent disclosures, thereby limiting costs to taxpayers. 
 208. See, e.g., id. at 217. In an agreement between the Federal Reserve Board and an 
institutional banker selling derivatives, the bank agreed to “adopt practices which ensure 
‘reasonable transparency of pricing and valuation’ so that customers can track the daily 
values of the complex instruments. Id. (citation omitted).  
 209. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 
No. 12-81311-CIV, 2013 WL 718503, at *6 n.22 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013). At the institu-
tional level, “[d]ealers on Wall Street have responded to the growing market by creating 
more complex instruments to impress end-users and earn huge fees through sales.” Cuccia, 
supra note 13, at 219; see also STAFF OF S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, supra note 24, at 2-3, 5-
10. 
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 Limited regulation in the form of disclosure-only requirements is 
necessary. Further requirements should not be imposed upon the 
precious and metals industry. If proper disclosure is made, further 
regulatory requirements would be repetitive, provide additional cost 
barriers, and devoice investors of their wishes. As discussed earlier, 
investors interested in this industry desire the risk and the high 
rates of return associated with the business. More regulation would 
impose more transaction costs associated with the investment, there-
by impeding this investment’s intended use to retail investors who 
have legitimate aspirations to involve themselves in high-risk, high-
return investment strategies. By inhibiting an investor’s choice to 
use his money in ways he deems best given his goals, the regulatory 
body is obstructing personal autonomy and thus overstepping its 
regulatory purpose of consumer protection.210  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The precious and industrial metals industry is deserving of some 
regulation as the retail public is in need of consumer protection vehi-
cles. By simply adequately informing the consumer through the use 
of disclosure-only regulation, the consumer maintains his own liberty 
in choosing his investment and is also provided the needed infor-
mation to make value-maximizing decisions. In promulgating some 
regulatory disclosure provisions, the industry is benefited rather 
than inhibited by transaction costs associated with regulation. As 
participants in the industry adapt to the regulation, the cost ab-
sorbed by the dealers will decrease with time as markets and their 
participants sophisticate. Just enough regulation increases investor 
confidence in the precious metals market, later leading to growth of 
the industry in our own backyard rather than overseas.211  
 In conclusion, the most equitable approach the CFTC should take 
in order to reduce costs of the agency and taxpayers, but still fulfill 
the agency’s purpose, would first be to establish clear regulatory ju-
risdiction over the retail precious and industrial metals industry. De-
lay in establishing clear regulatory jurisdiction, after the CFTC has 
already once experienced a similar situation in retail Forex, is un-
necessary and adds costs to all parties involved, even sending some 
important players in the industry out of business in an attempt to 
defend their business in court. Secondly, instead of instituting en-
forcement actions against those currently operating in the industry, 
 210. See Meyer, supra note 23. In regards to the proposed Forex regulation, one com-
mentator said that “ ‘[p]utting a cap [on leverage] is interference with the free-market sys-
tem and capitalism . . . . You are telling the investor how to invest their money. The first 
steps toward communism.’ ” Id. 
 211. “As [regulators] seek to impose oversight on spot foreign exchange transactions, 
they risk repelling investors from a fledging marketplace.” Id. 
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the CFTC should attempt to engage in negotiation with the industry 
in an effort to facilitate cooperation between the parties. With the 
CFTC and the metals industry in coordination, the CFTC should 
then promulgate the proposed regulation, with regulatory focus only 
on disclosure, to the extent beneficial to all parties involved. 
